Timpanogos Highlands, Inc. v. Emily D. Harper and Max D. Harper : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2000
Timpanogos Highlands, Inc. v. Emily D. Harper and
Max D. Harper : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jackson Howard; Howard, Lewis, and Petersen; Attorneys for defendants.
Gary A Sargent; Backman, Clark and March; Attorneys for Plaintiff.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Timpanogos Highlands, Inc v. Harper, No. 13936.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/73
j S / ^  ^ ^ 
l'\ - - -v. '« . \.* 
__,.-:,, XY 
t> V 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 1 fc-i.:, .. 




EMILY D. HARPER and 





BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS 
BRIEF OF COUNTER-APPELLANTS 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF 
UTAH, HONORABLE ALLEN B. SORENSEN, JUDGE 
GARY A. SARGENT, for: 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARCH 
500 American Savings Building 
61 South Main Street 




JACKSON HOWARD, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 






<*:V»k. "»,jpr,j/,v. C "•«.-;, 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IN REVIEWING AN EQUITY CASE, 
THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT 
REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
LOWER COURT UNLESS CLEARLY 
AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE 
EVIDENCE 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT 
IN FINDING THAT THE PREPON-
DERANCE OF EVIDENCE DEMON-
STRATED BUYERS HAD ABANDONED 
THE CONTRACT 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR 
IN FINDING PURCHASER'S TEN-
DER INADEQUATE, AND IN ANY 
CASE, THE TENDER WAS NOT 
VALID AFTER PURCHASER HAD 
BANDONED THE CONTRACT 
BRIEF OF COUNTER-APPELLANTS 
POINT I 
THE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED 
TO HAVE THEIR COUNTER-CLAIM 





Ahlstrand v. McPherson, 285 Minn 398, 173 N.W.2d 16 
330 (1969) 
Attebury v. Aulick, 204 Okl. 540, 231 P.2d 993 18 
(1951) 
C & W Electric, Inc. v. Casa Dorado Corp., 523 22 
P.2d 137 (Colo. App. 1974) 
Corbet v. Corbet, 24 Utah2d 378, 472 P.2d 430 8 
(1970) 
Cords v. Window Rock School Dist. No. 8, Apache 22 
Co., 22 Ariz.App. 223, 526 P.2d 757 (1974) 
Dowse v. Doris Trust Company, 116 Utah 106, 208 28, 30 
P.2d 956 (1949) 
Glenn v. Lowthar, 219 Ky. 383, 293 S.W. 947 (1927) 18 
Guard v. Maricopa County, 14 Ariz.App. 187, 481 9 
P.2d 873 (1971) 
Howarth v. Ostergaard, 30 Utah2d 183, 515 P.2d 29 
442 (1973) 
In Re Estate of Lyman, 7 Wash.App. 945, 503 P.2d 15, 22 
1127 (1972) 
Martin v. Buttar, 209 P.2d 636 (Cal. 1949) 23 
Martinson v. Publisher's Forest Products Com- 15, 22 
pany, 11 Wash.App. 42, 521 P.2d 233 (1974) 
Mason v. Hasso, 90 Ariz. 330, 389 P.2d 702 (1964) 15, 18 
Mathwig v. Ostrand, 132 Minn. 346, 157 N.W. 589 17 
(1916) 
Maxfield v. Sainsbury, 110 Utah 280, 172 P.2d 122 20 
(1946) 
Morrison v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 11 Utah2d 20 
416, 360 A.2d 1015 (1961) 
Narut v. Williams, 239 Mich. 376, 292 N.W. 336 16 
(1940) 
Olsen v. Kidman, 120 Utah 443, 235 P.2d 510 (1951) 27, 29 
Pender v. Dowse, 1 Utah2d 283, 265 P.2d 644 (1954) 28 
Powell v. Codifer & Bonnabel, Inc., 167 La. 97, 
118 S. 817 (1928) 
Provo City v. Jacobsen, 111 Utah 68, 176 P.2d 
130 (1947) 
Richins v. Struhs, 17 Utah2d 356, 412 P.2d 314 
(1966) 
Schluter v. Gentilly Terrace Co., 164 La. 663, 
114 So. 586 (1927) 
Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah 1974) 
Sine v. Harper, 118 Utah 415, 222 P.2d 517 (1950) 
Strum v. Heim, 95 Ariz. 300, 389 P.2d 702 (1964) 
Thomson v. Condas, 27 Utah2d 129, 493 P.2d 639 
(1972) 
Tucker v. Edward, 376 P.2d 253 (Okl. 1962) 
West v. West, 16 Utah2d 411, 403 P.2d 22 (1965) 
STATUTES CITED 
Section 78-24-2(3), Utah Code Anno. 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
39 ALR2d 840, Anno: Recording of Instrument 
Purporting to Effect Title as Slander of 
Title 
6 8 ALR2d 581, Anno: Land Contract Abandonment 
by Vendee 
1 Am.Jur.2d, Abandoned, Lost, Etc., Property 
50 Am.Jur.2d 1058 
McCormick on Evidence, 4th Ed., §65 
Model Code of Evidence 
Revised Draft of Rules of Evidence for the 
United States District Courts and 
Magistrates 
Uniform Rules of Evidence 
2 Wigmore, Evidence §578 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TIMPANOGOS HIGHLANDS, INC., 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
EMILY D. HARPER and 
MAX D. HARPER, 
Defendants-
Respondents. 
Case No. 13,936 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by a purchaser, the appellant herein, against 
sellers, the respondents herein, for specific performance of a 
real estate contract entered into on September 15, 1957. The 
sellers claim the buyer abandoned the contract. The sellers also 
counterclaim for slander of title as a result of the buyer's 
recording of the contract on May 1, 1972 and a subsequent assign-
ment on December 27, 1973. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court submitted the question of abandonment to an 
eight member advisory jury. The jury and the court found that 
the plaintiff had abandoned the contract. The court thereupon 
entered judgment against the plaintiff determining that the 
plaintiff had abandoned the contract and relinquished any right 
that it had in the property. The court granted plaintiff judg-
ment against the defendants1 counterclaim for slander of title-no 
cause of action. 
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The court denied defendants1 motion to vacate the order 
dismissing the defendants1 counterclaim. 
In addition, the court denied plaintiff's motions for a 
mistrial, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, for a new 
trial, and to amend the findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
m 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
m 
The appellant seeks to have the judgment of abandonment of
 m 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract reversed and to have a decree i 
I 
entered awarding specific performance to the appellant compelling 
the respondents to convey good and sufficient title to the appel- F 
lant. 
Respondents seek affirmance of the judgment of abandonment • 
and seek an order re-instating respondents1 counterclaim for • 
I 
slander of title and remanding the counterclaim to the lower 
court for trial. 
i 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
i 
In September, 1957, Perry Harper and his wife Emily Harper i 
were aged 69 and 68 years respectively. (R. 117) They lived in i 
i 
Lindon, Utah County, Utah, where they owned a tract of land 
comprising approximately 71 acres, which property is the subject 
matter of this action. 
i 
On September 18, 1957, Perry W. Harper and Emily D. Harper i 
entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract as sellers wherein i 
they contracted to sell the property to Karl B. Hale and Roy D. 
Barrett for the sum of $35,000.00, (P. Ex. nl n, D. Ex. "15", 
i 
Finding of Fact No. 4). 
Appellant, Timpanogos Highlands, Inc., was incorporated i 
December 8, 1964, and Karl B. Hale acted as president of the i 
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corporation until his death on May 24, 1969. (R. 16-17). Karl 
B. Hale assigned his interest in the contract to the appellant, 
Timpanogos Highlands, Inc., on February 21, 1965. That assign-
ment was never recorded. (P. Ex. "6", R. 23, 62). The appellant 
recorded the Uniform Real Estate Contract, on the 1st day of May, 
1972. (P. Ex. "1", R. 60). Subsequently, the appellant recorded 
an assignment from Roy A. Barrett and Ruth Redd Barrett which 
assigned all their interests under the contract to the appellant. 
That assignment was dated June 7, 1973, and was recorded by 
appellant on December 27, 1973. (P. Ex. "3", R. 63-64, Findings 
of Fact Nos. 5, 21, 22). The respondents were never advised of 
either of these assignments. (R. 101-102, 130-131). 
Perry W. Harper died May 14, 1966, and Emily D. Harper died 
June 26, 1974. (R. 118). Prior to his death, Perry W. Harper 
transferred all right, title and interest which he held in the 
contract property to Emily D. Harper and Max D. Harper by a deed 
dated March 11, 1959. (P. Ex. "2", R. 120, Finding of Fact No. 
6) . Upon the death of Emily D. Harper, Max D. Harper succeeded 
to all of her interest by reason of the fact that he was a joint 
tenant with her in the ownership of the property. (P. Ex. "2", 
Finding of Fact No. 7). 
By the terms of the contract the appellant was to pay 
$3,000.00 per year and pay the taxes and water assessments upon 
the property. (P. Ex. "1", R. 57, Finding of Fact No. 8). 
Between September 17, 1957, and November, 1968, the appellant and 
its predecessors made payments on the contract totaling $24,150.00. 
(P. Ex. ,f9H). From November, 1968, to the time this lawsuit was 
instituted, the appellant failed to pay any amount on the contract. 
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(R. 56). During the life of the contract, the appellant also 
failed to pay any of the taxes due upon the property and failed 
to pay $25,581.52 in installments due. (P. Ex. "21", R. 132). 
As of the date this action commenced, the appellant was delinquent 
in the payment of installments and interest upon the property in * 
i 
the amount of $34,523.30 and was delinquent in the payment of 
• 
taxes due upon the property in the amount of $4,413.70. (P. Ex. 
"9", "21", Finding of Fact No. 9). 
The taxes on the property increased drastically from $69.29 • 
in 1966 to $1,475.13 in 1967. (R. 126). Because of the increase ! 
i 
in the taxes, the appellant by and through its president, Karl B. 
Hale, told the respondents in December, 1968, that he would not 
be able to keep the property and that he would have to let it go.
 f 
(R. 126-128, 144-145, Finding of Fact No. 12). In December, ' 
1968, Karl B. Hale was telephoned by Ruby Harper West, a sister -
i 
to Max D. Harper and a daughter of Emily D. Harper. During that 
I 
telephone conversation Mr. Hale told Mrs. Harper that because of j 
the increased tax assessment,, he felt that he would have to , 
abandon the property. (R. 232). The respondents relied upon the 
assertion of the appellant that it intended to abandon the pro- ' 
i 
perty and leased the same for a period of ten (10) years to 
i 
William Mack Walker on December 12, 1968. (D. Ex. "4", R. 145, j 
Finding of Fact No. 13). 
At no time from the signing of the contract to the present 
has the appellant or its predecessors been in physical or con-
structive possession of the property. (R. 53-56, Finding of Fact 
No. 13). 
The following contacts were the only contacts made between 
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the appellant and the respondents during the period of May, 
1969, to January, 1973: 
(1) In the summer of 1969, Mr. Paul B. Tanner, C.P.A. and 
secretary-treasurer of the appellant, made some contact with the 
respondents. The contact was made merely to obtain respondents1 
opinion as to what the remaining balance was on the contract. 
(R. 252). 
(2) The next contact was made by Lynn G. Hale in December, 
1969, or January, 1970. (R. 29, 90, 145). Mr. Hale made the 
contact as the successor president of Timpanogos Highlands, Inc. 
The substance of the conversation on that date is disputed. 
(R. 29, 85-86, 132, 136, 145). 
(3) The respondents were not contacted again until December 
of 1970. At that time, Mr. Hale made a written proposal to Mr. 
Harper. (D.Ex. "5", R. 30-32, R. 82-83, 136). 
That proposal states as follows: 
From proceeds of coming sale we will pay 
(about 30 Jan) $1,500. 
From proceeds of next sale will pay (about 
Apr) 1 $1,000. 3 mos. later we will pay 
$625 & $625 thereafter each 3 mos. 
At least by the time we realize income 
from Lindon Development we will pay $3,000 
per year as per contract and as sales per-
mit amts in excess of contract to bring it 
current. Till paid in full. 
Timpanogos Highlands 
/s/ Lynn G. Hale 
•^ The phrase "about Apr." conflicts with the phrase "about a yr" 
as stated in appellant's brief. (App. Brief, 5-6, 14) Apparently, 
appellant's counsel had difficulty reading Exhibit "5".Lynn B. Hale, 
who wrote the document, read the document in Court and stated that 
the document said "about April One Thousand Dollars." (R. 82). 
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The respondents understood Mr. Hale's appearance and written 
memorandum as a new offer. (R. 133-134, 145-146). Mr. Harper 
indicated he would take the offer to his family. (R. 146, 31). 
(4) No further contact was made by appellant until January, 
1972. At that time, Mr. Harper told Mr. Hale to contact the 
respondents1 attorney. (R. 32, 91, 147-148). 
(5) Mr. Hale finally contacted the respondents' attorney, 
Mr. Cassity, in March of 1972. (R. 33-34, 39-42, 84). 
(6) A year later, January 1973, appellant again contacted 
respondents' attorney. The attorney, Mr. Cassity, told Mr. Hale 
that it was the intention of the Harper family to take the 
property back; that the sale had failed. (R. 188). The attorney 
also requested Mr. Hale to compute a payoff figure and send it to 
him which was done. (R. 43). 
Mr. Cassity presented the proposed balance to the Harper 
family as an offer of conciliation or settlement. The Harpers 
told Mr. Cassity that they felt they should have the property v 
back in light of appellant's abandonment by its failure to make 
payments or pay the taxes. (R. 188-189, 191-192). 
(7) Additional conversations and correspondence occurred 
between the attorneys of the parties between February, 1973, 
and the end of April, 1973. (R. 45, 88). 
(8) In late April, 1973, Mr. Hale took a cashier's check in 
the amount of $30,384.25, payable to Timpanogos Highlands, Inc., 
to Mr. Harper and offered it as a tender to pay off the contract. 
Mr. Harper rejected the payment. (P. Ex. 7, R. 48-49, 148). 
(9) Finally, in late April or early May, 1973, Mr. Hale 
telephoned Mr. Cassity and was informed that Mr. Harper had a new 
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attorney, Mr. Jackson Howard. Mr. Hale called Mr. Howard and was 
informed that the Harpers were going to rely upon the appellant's 
abandonment of the contract. (R. 47, 82). 
Mr. Hale then contacted his attorney and this action was 
instituted. (R. 48). 
ARGUMENT 
The appellant, in its brief, correctly characterizes the 
argument on appeal as one involving questions of fact and not one 
involving questions of law. "Argument centers in appellant's 
contention that the undisputed and uncontradicted evidence before 
the trial court does not fairly preponderate in favor of an 
abandonment as found by the court.11 (Appellant's brief p. 8). 
The appellant further states that its "Argument seeks to 
illuminate the many undisputed factors evidencing a lack of 
abandonment as well as touching upon areas of contradictory 
evidence which appellant contends is unbelievable as presented by 
respondent." (Appellant's brief p.8). 
Unfortunately, appellant fails to distinguish for the court 
the disputed from the undisputed facts. Indeed, in this respect 
the appellant misleads the court throughout its brief. Almost 
the entire statement of facts as written by the appellant is 
supported only by references to testimony of witnesses called by 
the appellant or by exhibits introduced by the appellant. 
It is obvious from the record that the plain-
tiff, in assembling its brief on appeal, recited 
facts favorable only to its own interests and 
claims, some of which appear to have been out of 
context with the whole record. Thomson v. Con-
das, 27 Utah2d 129, 493 P.2d 639 (1972). 
It was held by this Court in Thomson, supra, that appellants 
cannot cite only the evidence most favorable to their position. 
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We believe there was ample evidence, com-
petent and admissible, that supported the trial 
court (in which event we must affirm) that the 
presumption of its correctness was duly support-
ed, that the plaintiffs did not point up where 
the findings were not supported by evidence, 
which they must, that plaintiffs1 chose to re-
cite evidence most favorable to its contention 
to the exclusion of other evidence favorable to 
defendants, which is not permissable on appel-
late review, and that in any event the evidence 
upon which they relied was a stranger to the 
clear and convincing evidence demanded in a 
case like this, and we so hold* 
Since the appellant's appeal centers around an attempt to 
have this court reverse the factual judgment of the court below, 
it is appellant's duty to state the undisputed and disputed facts 
as clearly and objectively as possible. This the appellant has 
failed to do* 
In responding to the points in appellant's brief, the respon-
dents indicate where appellant has misconstrued the facts, set 
forth the applicable law, show what evidence on testimony was 
introduced at trial and demonstrate how that evidence on testi-
mony affects the points raised by the appellant. 
POINT I 
IN REVIEWING AN EQUITY CASE, THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT 
REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT UNLESS CLEARLY AGAINST 
THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
In an equity case, the reviewing court may consider and 
weigh all of the evidence, but will not reverse the trial court's 
findings unless such findings are against the clear weight of the 
evidence or contrary to law or established principles of equity• 
Richins v. Struhs, 17 Utah2d 356, 412 P.2d 314, 315 (1966)• Corbet 
v. Corbet, 24 Utah2d 378, 472 P.2d 430, 432 (1970. West v. West, 
16 Utah2d 411, 403 P.2d 22, 23 (1965). While it is the duty and 
privilege of the court to review both law and facts, due consi-
deration should be given to the opinion of the trial court judge 
who hears the evidence and sees the witnesses. Provo City v. 
Jacobsen, 111 Utah 68, 176 P.2d 130, 131 (1947). It is a well 
recognized rule of law that the burden is on the appellant to 
establish error on the part of the trial court. Such error must 
be clear and unequivocal and unless the appellant can show that 
the lower court's decision was totally unjustified, the reviewing 
court has no alternative but to affirm. Searle v. Searle, 522 
P.2d 697 (Utah 1974). Guard v. Maricopa County, 14 Ariz. App. 
187, 481 P.2d 873 (1971). 
This case was considered by an advisory jury which found for 
respondents, and the decision of the jurors was adopted by the 
trial court. In effect, two distinct judgments were rendered, 
and such judgments should not be lightly overruled. In its 
brief, the appellant has only argued questions of fact about 
which reasonable men might differ. These facts were determined 
by the jury and the trial court judge to preponderate in respon-
dents1 favor. 
Respondents submit that appellant has not met its obligation 
to show that the trial court was in error. Many of the facts 
which are stated in appellant's brief as ultimate facts are in 
reality disputed facts which were debated and contested in the 
lower court. Appellant offers little proof that the trial court 
erred in finding that the preponderance of the evidence favored 
respondents. Unless the appellant presents a clear and persua-
sive analysis of the trial court's failure to reach a correct 
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conclusion on the basis of the evidence, the judgment of the 
lower court should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THAT THE PREPONDER-
ANCE OF EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATED BUYERS HAD ABANDONED THE CONTRACT. 
Abandonment is not capable of a precise definition. It 
comprises many variables and must be determined on a case by case 
basis as particular circumstances and facts dictate. As defined 
by Tucker v. Edwards, 376 P.2d 253, 255 (Okl. 1962), "The elements 
of abandonment consist of an intention to abandon, plus an overt 
or 'external1 act by which the intention is carried into effect." 
According to 68 ALR2d 590, Anno: Land Contract-Abandonment by 
Vendee §3, the acts relied on as evidence of abandonment by the 
vendee must be "positive, unequivocal, and inconsistent with the 
existence of a contract," Respondents contend that these cri-
teria are met and the evidence conclusively shows abandonment of 
the contract by the appellant. 
In its brief, appellant lists the elements that are frequent-
ly considered in determining whether or not abandonment has 
occurred. This list of elements is purportedly taken from 1 
Am.Jur.2d, Abandoned, Lost, Etc., Property §1; however, that 
section does not contain the specifications elaborated by appel-
lant. Respondents are not apprised of appellant's source and 
authority for these elements, but at any rate, appellant's list 
is incomplete. Respondents contend that two other factors to 
consider are whether or not the purchaser has defaulted on pay-
ments and whether or not the value of the land in dispute has 
increased since the purchaser's default. 6 8 ALR2d, 5 84-5 Anno: 
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Land Contract-Abandonment by Vendee, §2. This latter element 
reflects upon the motive and good faith of the buyer. Thus a 
more complete list reads as follows: 
1. Possession or lack of possession of the real property 
by the purchaser, 
2. Lapse of time without claiming or using the property, 
3. Failure to pay the taxes, 
4. Failure to make installment payments, 
5. Increased value of the land, 
6. Declaration of an intention to abandon by the purchaser. 
Appellant maintains that lack of possession, lapse of time 
without making a claim, and failure to pay taxes are not deter-
minative of the question of abandonment. Appellant does not cite 
any case law in support of its contentions or legal theories. 
Despite appellant's failure to cite any case law as authority for 
its position, respondents agree that these factors, individually 
considered, need not be determinative in the context of a parti-
cular case. Nevertheless, these are certainly valid and impor-
tant factors which, considered together, may strongly suggest 
that abandonment has occurred. Thus, the failure of the pur-
chaser to be in possession need not be determinative of abandon-
ment if other requirements of the contract have been met. In 
this case, however, the appellant was not in possession of the 
property, consistently made late and inadequate payments on the 
contract, refused to pay the taxes, defaulted entirely for a six-
year period, expressed its intention to abandon the property, and 
only sought enforcement of the contract after the value of the 
property had gone up. Each of these elements existing in conjunc-
tion with the others was sufficient and substantial evidence to 
justify the jury in finding that appellant had in fact abandoned 
the contract. 
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In its brief, appellant admits it has never been in posses-
sion of the property, has never used the property, and has never 
paid taxes on the property. Appellant contends that such failure 
to possess or use the land or pay taxes was excused by reason of te 
a subsequent oral agreement that existed between purchaser and p 
sellers* The argument that appellant forwards is that it agreed 
P 
to relinquish the right to possess and use the land and in consi- j 
deration thereof the sellers agreed to pay the property taxes.
 $ 
The original written contract expressly provided that the " 
purchaser was to pay the property taxes. (P. Ex. "1"). Despite I 
I 
this express agreement, appellant insists that the subsequent 
I 
oral agreement vitiates the written contract in this respect. 
Even supposing that this later agreement existed, it is a well-
 ( 
known rule of law that a subsequent oral agreement which modifies ' 
or varies the terms of the original contract is violative of ' 
the parole evidence rule and the statute of frauds. 
The question of whether there ever was a subsequent oral j 
agreement modifying the original contract so that the "sellers , 
would possess the property and in consideration therefor would ' 
pay the taxes" (Appellant's brief, p. 10), was one of the most ' 
hotly debated issues at trial. (R. 172-181, 244-245). Further-
! 
more, almost all of page eleven of appellant's brief is a mis- j 
characterization of the facts. Appellant claims that the pur-
ported agreement as to taxes and possession was the basis for 
respondents entering into a lease agreement with Mack Walker in I 
2The respondents objected at the trial to the admissibility 
of the subsequent oral agreement because it was "testimony attempt-
ing to vary the terms of a written instrument, it violates the 
parole evidence rule." The objection was overruled. (R. 237-233). 
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1968, The respondents contend, however, that the basis for the 
lease was the fact that Karl B. Hale told Mr. Harper that he "was 
going to have to give up the contract, that he had more than a 
man could handle." (R. p. 179). Thus, appellant's statement of 
facts concerning this alleged agreement is in no way consistent 
with the evidence presented at trial or with the findings of fact 
of the lower court. 
Non-use and non-possession of the property, as well as fail-
ure to pay the property taxes, were factors which the jury considered 
as evidence of appellant's abandonment of the contract. 
Appellant also contends that no lapse of time occurred 
wherein purchaser did not claim the property. Appellant supports 
this allegation by insisting that: 
(1) $24,150.00 was paid on the contract; and ' 
(2) Since 1968 there were repeated contacts between pur-
chaser and sellers and such contacts purportedly renewed purchasers 
claims. 
Respondents do not dispute that purchaser has paid $24,150.00 
on the contract. However, evidence was introduced to show that 
payments made by appellant to achieve this sum were erratic at 
best. (P. Ex. "21"). Appellant, consistently made late and 
deficient payments between September, 1957, and November, 1968. 
At times the payments did not even cover the interest due on the 
installments. (P. Ex. "21"). While payment of this sum may 
suggest that appellant had a claim to the property, appellant's 
later default coupled with its failure to meet the other terms of 
the contract vitiated that claim. Appellant's total failure to 
make any payments whatsoever on the property after 1968 lends 
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credence to the assumption that appellant abandoned any claim it 
had to the property. 
Appellant also declares that since purchaser maintained some 
communication with the sellers between 1957 and 1968, such contact 
was sufficient to reinstate appellant's claim to the property. 
It must be noted that any contact between purchaser and sellers 
was sporadic at best, and each contact was followed by long 
periods of silence and inaction by the purchaser. Appellant 
alleges that correspondence and telephone conversations regarding 
the contract occurred during the summer of 1969. (App. Br. 6-7). 
In December, 1969, Mr. Hale met with Mr. Harper concerning the 
contract but nothing came of the meeting. Mr. Hale met with Mr. 
Harper once more in December, 1970,-a year later. They discussed 
the contract and Mr. Hale wrote a memo reflecting the discussion. 
Appellant made no attempt to meet the terms indicated in that 
memo. Over a year later, in January of 1972, some correspondence 
concerning the contract transpired between the parties and their 
attorneys. Then in January and February of 1973, Mr. Hale 
allegedly contacted sellers1 attorney regarding a payoff figure. 
Unable to reach a settlement with sellers1 attorney, Mr. Hale 
computed his own payoff figure (which was incorrect) and pre-
sented a check to seller in April of 1973. The check was not 
made out to sellers, but, in fact, was made out to Timpanogos 
Investment Company, Inc. Finally, a month after sellers refused 
to accept purchaser's purported tender, purchaser initiated this 
suit for specific performance. 
Despite appellant's complicated and detailed analysis of the 
various communications between purchaser and sellers, the undeni-
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able fact remains that purchaser never performed according to the 
contract. Purchaser defaulted on every installment due between 
1968 and 1974. Purchaser absolutely failed to meet any of the 
terms that it had proposed in its 1970 memorandum* Appellant's 
argument that purchaser made these contacts in an effort to dis-
cover from sellers what payments were required to fulfill the 
contract is totally without merit. Appellant had a copy of the 
original contract and was familiar with its terms. It had re-
cords reflecting past payments on the property. It even retained 
an accountant to compute the payments due and owing. (R. 251-257). 
Sellers in no way prevented purchaser from performing the terms 
of the contract. 
It is a well recognized rule that "conduct manifesting an 
intention to abandon is sufficient if the conduct of one party 
is inconsistent with continued existence of the contract and 
that conduct is known to and acquiesced in by the other." In Re 
Estate of Lyman, 7 Wash. App. 945, 503 P.2d 1127, 1131 (1972). 
Martinson v. Publisher's Forest Products Company, 11 Wash. App. 
42, 521 P.2d 233, 237 (1974). Respondents maintain that appel-
lant's continual failure to make payments to cover either prin-
cipal or interest after 1968 is conduct inconsistent with the 
terms of the contract and conclusively demonstrates abandonment. 
When default in payments occurs in conjunction with one 
or more of the other factors mentioned: failure to be in pos-
session, failure to use or make improvements on the property, 
failure to pay the property taxes; then abandonment is almost 
certain to be found. 
In Mason v. Hasso, 90 Ariz. 1926, 367 P.2d 1, 5 (1961), the 
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appellant contracted to purchase realty but after putting $100 
down failed to pay the balance on the down payment, and failed to 
pay the subsequent installments, taxes, or interest on the pro-
perty. Appellants had also notified respondents that they could 
not meet their obligations. Appellants sought enforcement of the 
contract after the value of the property rose and a third party 
offered to buy it from them. The court found that these acts and 
omissions by the plaintiff signified complete abandonment of the 
property. The appellate court affirmed the judgment for the 
sellers. 
In Tucker v. Edwards, supra, the plaintiff had entered into 
a contract of sale with defendants in 1946 and gone into pos-
session of the property. Payments were delinquent and failed 
completely between 1956 and 1960 when the plaintiff filed suit. 
Some years prior to initiating the suit, the plaintiff had 
vacated the property. The court found that plaintiff's conduct 
was sufficient to show he had abandoned the contract. 
The court in Sturm v. Heim, 95 Ariz. 300, 389 P.2d 702 
(1964), denied the purchaser's request for specific performance 
notwithstanding the fact that 89% of the purchase price had been 
paid and purchaser had gone into possession. The court based its 
decision on the fact that purchaser had been in default for 7 
years and the contract provided that payments must be made punc-
tually. The court also said that subsequent negotiations during 
those seven years did not revive the contract. 
Other cases to the same effect are Narut v. Williams, 239 
Mich. 376, 292 NW 336 (1940), Ahlstrand v. McPherson, 285 Minn. 
398, 173 NW2d 330 (1969) [court said purchasers had abandoned the 
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contract because they had not taken possession, had not paid 
taxes for four years, and had been in default for 33 months on 
installment payments.]. Mathwig v. Ostrand, 132 Minn. 346, 157 N>/W. 
589 (1916), Powell v. Codifer and Bonnabel, Inc., 167 La. 97, 118 
S. 817 (1928). At any rate, whether or not appellant's repeated 
defaults constitute abandonment is a question of fact. The trier 
of fact in the present case concluded that appellant had indeed 
abandoned the contract. 
Finally, the fact that the value of the property increased 
greatly between the time of appellant's default and its suit for 
specific performance suggests bad faith and improper motive on 
the part of appellant. 68 ALR2d 596 Anno: Land Contract -
Abandonment by Vendee, §4(d) declares: 
Not infrequently a vendee's assertion of rights 
i under the land contract does not take place un-
til the .value of the property has increased. 
The following are cases in which a rise in value was men-
tioned by the court as a reason for determining the contract had 
been abandoned: 
In Powell v. Codifer and Bonnabel, Inc., supra, the pur-
chaser, who never went into possession or made improvements on 
the land, defaulted in payments in 1918 after paying about half 
the total purchase price. In 1921 the land was sold to a third 
party. During the period of default, the land saw an increase of 
seven times its original value. The court held that the pur-
chaser abandoned the contract when she ceased making payments on 
the land. 
A similar situation occurred in Schluter v. Gentilly Terrace 
Co., 164 La. 663, 114 So. 586 (1927). The purchaser did not go 
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into possession of the land or make improvements on it* Pur-
chaser's total payments amounted to less than 50% of the purchase 
price of the property. In 1922, the seller notified the pur-
chaser that he was 6 years delinquent in his payments and that 
unless a substantial payment was made within 30 days, the con-
tract would be cancelled. The purchaser failed to comply with 
this demand and the contract was cancelled. The land increased 
in value, and in 1925 the purchaser tendered to the seller the 
balance due under the contract. When refused, the purchaser 
initiated this suit for specific performance. The court observed 
that the purchaser could not be allowed to play the role of 
"watchful waiting" through a period of years and only perform his 
obligations under the contract in order to reap at a late date 
the benefits of its increased value. 
Again, in Glenn v. Lowthar, 219 Ky. 383, 293 S.W. 947 (1927), 
the land contract in question was ignored for 7 years. The 
buyers who were insolvent most of this time, made no payments on 
the property and never took possession of the property. When the 
land increased in value and the buyers attempted to enforce the 
contract, the court said that a purchaser may not lie by and lead 
the other party to believe that he has abandoned the contract and 
then, when the land has increased in value 20 times, claim the 
benefit of the contract he decided not to claim before the land 
rose in value. See also Attebury v. Aulick, 204 Okla. 540, 231 
P.2d 993 (1951), Mason v.Hasso, supra, 90 Ariz. 126, 367 P.2d 1 
(1961). 
Respondents maintain that appellant should be estopped from 
reaping the benefits of the contract after violating its terms 
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for so many years. The fact that the land in contention has 
increased substantially in value since appellant's last payment 
over 6 years ago is indicative of appellant's bad faith and 
questionable motive in purporting to tender the balance due under 
the contract at such a late date* 
In Part (D) of Point II of its brief appellant asserts that 
there is no credible evidence that a stated intention to abandon 
the property was ever made; further, that any statement by Karl 
B. Hale, deceased, is inadmissable under the terms of the Utah 
Dead Man's Statute and that Karl B. Hale had no authority to 
abandon the property as agent for the corporation. Respondents 
answer and submit that: 
(1) The testimony concerning statements by Karl B. Hale is 
not barred by the Utah Dead Man's Statute, and 
(2) A stated intention to abandon is not necessary/as in-
tent to abandon may be implied and inferred from all. the circum-
stances and the conduct of the parties. 
Appellant argues that testimony by Max Harper and Ruby 
Harper West concerning statements made to them by Karl B. Hale, 
deceased/ should not have been admitted into evidence by the 
trial court. (App. Br. 19-20). Appellant claims that the testi-
mony should have been barred by the Utah Dead Man's Statute, 
U.C.A. §78-24-2 (3). 
The dead man statutes have largely been eliminated in the 
past century. The harsh and irrational application of these 
rules to prevent any interested party from testifying has been 
widely recognized. In England, "no shred of disqualification in 
civil cases remains." McCormick on Evidence, 4th Ed., §65, p. 
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142. Despite the trend away from such rigorous rules, many 
states retain statutes which bar testimony by interested parties 
concerning claims against the estate of a deceased party. Such 
statutes have been regarded as necessary to restrain the tempta-
tion to give false testimony. . ." Maxfield v. Sainsbury 110 
« 
Utah 280, 172 P.2d 122 (1946). Most commentators now agree that 
i 
refusal to listen to one who may have a claim against the estate j 
of a deceased person works more injustice than the evil to be , 
prevented. 2 Wigmore, Evidence, §578. As a result, courts ' 
strictly construe the dead man statutes and limit them to the ' 
i 
specific exclusions contained therein. 
! 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the validity of these , 
arguments against the dead man1s statute. In Morrison v. Walker j 
Bank & Trust Co., 11 Utah2d 416/ 360 P.2d 1015 (1961), this Court ' 
ruled that the statute. . . \ 
limits the introduction of testimony which 
might be of value in determining the ulti- | 
mate truth and, therefore, should be narrow- j 
ly construed. Id. at 1017. 
i 
See also Sine v. Harper, 118 Utah 415, 222 P.2d 571 (1950). 
In Morrison, supra, the Court found that the testimony in 
question was not specifically disqualified by the statute and I 
was, therefore, admissible. Respondents submit that the facts in ] 
I 
this case present the identical issue presented in Morrison. 
The trial court specifically questioned the appellant con-
cerning the applicability of the dead man's statute to this case. 
Appellant1s lawyer admitted that his client did not fall within 
the provisions specified by the court because Timpanogos High-
lands, Inc., is a grantee of the deceased. (R. 125, 224). 
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Since the statute requires that the adverse party be an adminis-
trator, heir, legatee, or devisee of a deceased person, appellant 
clearly does not come within the provisions of the statute. 
On appeal, appellant has attempted to circumvent the rulings 
of the Supreme Court and the express language of the statute by 
arguing that the statute should be liberally construed. This 
argument is contrary to the policies and precedents of this 
Court. If appellant were permitted his argument, testimony by 
any interested persons would be barred. Such a decision, respondents 
submit, would clearly conflict with the modern tendency to abandon 
the dead manfs statute or strictly interpret it. This tendency 
away from disqualification is supported by the Model Code of 
Evidence, the Uniform Rules of Evidence and the Revised Draft of 
Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and 
Magistrates* 
Appellant also argues that the testimony concerning state-
ments by Karl B. Hale is inadmissible hearsay. Appellant's 
contention is that Karl B. Hale had transferred his interest in 
the property in 1965 and had no interest in the property at the 
time the statements were made. Appellant fails to mention that 
in 1968 Karl B. Hale was the president of Timpanogos Highlands, 
Inc., a family corporation. His agency to act for the corpora-
tion is thus readily apparent. The assignment from Hale to the 
appellant was never recorded and was not known to the respondents 
at the time he expressed his intention to abandon the contract. 
(P. Ex. "6", R. 23, 62, 101-102, 130-131). 
Appellant alleges agency on the part of Karl Hale to make 
the payments of 1968 but denies his agency to make any declara-
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tion in that year concerning abandonment. Appellant must either 
admit that Karl B. Hale acted on behalf of Timpanogos Highlands, 
Inc. as its agent or maintain that none of his acts were sane- > 
tioned by the corporation. ' * 
As president of Timpanogos Highlands, Inc., Karl B. Hale was 
i 
a duly constituted agent for that corporation. Any declarations 
against his interest or that of the corporation are admissible as i 
exceptions to the hearsay rule. The testimony by Max Harper and i 
Ruby Harper West was properly admitted as declarations against f 
interest and is not barred by the Utah Dead Man's Statute. \ 
At any rate, a stated intention to abandon is not necessary. 
j 
Numerous cases support the theory that intent is implied from the i 
objection behavior of the parties to a contract. In Cords v. \ 
Window Rock School District, No. 8, Apache Co., 22 Ariz.App. 223, 
526 P.2d 757 (1974), the court said: "Abandonment is a matter of \ 
intent and can be infered from the conduct of the parties and the 
! 
attendant circumstances." This principle is echoed in C & W j 
Electric, Inc. v. Casa Dorado Corp., 523 P.2d 137 (Colo. App. i 
1974) . In Re Estate of Lyman, supra; Martinson v. Publisher's 
Forest Products Co., supra. 
( 
Respondents submit that appellant's behavior is inconsistent 
with the contract and appellant's intent to abandon the contract j 
may be inferred by the following: 
1. Appellant was never in possession of the property? 
2. Appellant never used the property and failed to assert a 
valid claim to the property between 1968 and 1974; 
3. Appellant failed to pay the property taxes; 
4. Appellant consistently made inadequate and delinquent 
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payments and finally defaulted altogether between 19 68 and 1974; 
5. Appellant attempted performance only after the value of 
the land increased dramatically; 
6. Appellant, through Karl B. Hale, did explicitly state 
an intention to abandon the contract. 
In Martin v. Butter, 209 P.2d 636, 638 (Cal., 1949) the 
court said: 
Any words or acts by one party which indi-
cate that he will not perform the contract or per-
mit the other party to do so, amounts to an aban-
donment. Thus a party may abandon a contract by 
refusing to proceed further with its fulfillment, 
and his breach of the contract, if material, jus-
tifies the other party in treating the contract as 
abandoned and in abandoning it himself. In such 
case, abandonment by one party is eguivilent to a 
claim of rescission which may be acquiesced in by 
the other, thereby effecting a mutual rescission, no 
formal rescission being necessary after one has ac-
knowledged his inability to perform and has volun-
tarily abandoned the contract. 
These manifestations evincing appellant's intention to aban-
don the contract were presented to the trial court and that court 
found that such intention could be inferred from the evidence. A 
similar dispute arose in Tucker v. Edwards, supra. The appellate 
court said: 
We have not overlooked plaintiff's testimony, 
emphasized in his brief, to the effect that he 
never at any time intended to abandon the proper-
ty. However, this conflict in the evidence was 
resolved in defendants1 favor by the trial court, 
and it is well settled that where the evidence 
in a case of equitable cognizance is conflicting, 
the trial court's finding thereon will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly against 
the weight thereof. (Cites Bailey v. Lovin, 202 
Okl. 17, 209 P.2d 994). 
For the foregoing reasons, respondents submit that appel-
lant's conduct clearly indicates an intention to abandon the 
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contract. The decision of the trial court which confirmed 
appellant's abandonment should not be disturbed. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING PURCHASER'S TENDER 
INADEQUATE AND IN ANY CASE, THE TENDER WAS NOT VALID AFTER PUR-
CHASER HAD ABANDONED THE CONTRACT. 
The trial court found that purchaser's tender was inadequate 
and invalid. 
Quoting from Finding of Fact 17: 
17. On the 24th day of May, 19 73, the 
plaintiff paid into Court the sum of $30,677.70, 
for the tender of the delinquent amount owing on 
the purchase price. The amount tendered was not 
the amount owing on the purchase price and taxes 
payable and was, in fact, deficient in the amount 
of $1,515.31 and the defendant was not obligated 
to accept the said tender nor was the said tender 
adequate under the law. Further, the said tender 
did not include any tender for $4,414.70 for 
taxes or. water assessments owing. Further, such 
tender did not include interest on taxes paid by 
the defendant but for which the defendant was en-
titled to 9% per annum under the contract. 
The tender by the appellant was not proper for several reasons: 
(1) The check offered by Mr. Hale was made out to Timpanogos 
Investment Company and not to the respondents. (P. Ex. "17", 
R. 100). 
(2) The title of record was not in the name of the appel-
lant at the time of the tender. The assignment from Karl Hale 
to the appellant, although made prior to the tender, was never 
recorded. (P. Ex. "6", R. 23, 62). 
(3) The assignment from Roy A. Barrett and his wife to the 
appellant was not even dated and consequently not recorded until 
after the tender was made, and in fact, after this action was 
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commenced. (P. Ex. "3", R. 63-64). The appellant at the time 
of the tender could have had no more that a one-half interest 
in the property. 
(4) The respondents were not aware of the interest of the 
appellant at the time of the tender and were never advised of 
either of the assignments. (R. 101-102, 130-131, 151). 
It is evident that the tender by the appellant was deficient 
in several respects and, therefore, the respondents had no 
obligation to accept it. 
Respondents maintain that regardless of the adequacy or in-
adequacy of the tender, appellant should not be allowed to tender 
performance after having abandoned the contract. As already 
indicated, appellant had defaulted in payments for over six (6) 
years. Abandonment, by its very terms, means that the party 
abandoning the contract has relinquished all his right, title and 
interest under the contract. Any expectation of recovering the 
property is thereby irrevocably lost. 1 Am.Jur.2d, 3-4, Abandoned, 
Lost, Etc. Property §1. The lower court found that the appellant 
abandoned the contract. It should not then be permitted to en-
force the contract at its convenience and after the value of the 
land had increased substantially. The sufficiency of the tender, 
then, is not the real issue; rather, it is whether the appellant 
can be allowed to take advantage of the sellers without having 
performed any of its obligations under the contract. Respondents 
submit that the trial court's refusal to acknowledge purchaser's 
tender in light of purchaser's former conduct should be upheld by 
this court. 
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BRIEF OF COUNTER-APPELLANTS 
POINT I 
THE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO HAVE THEIR COUNTER-CLAIM OF 
SLANDER OF TITLE TRIED TO A COURT. 
Subsequent to the abandonment of the property, the appellant 
caused to be recorded on May 1, 1972, a Uniform Real Estate Con-
tract, It also recorded on December 27, 1973, (after the lawsuit 
was commenced) an assignment from Roy A. and Ruth Barrett to the 
appellant. The assignment was dated June 7, 1973, although the 
lawsuit was commenced May 24, 1973. (P. Ex. "3", R. 63-64). As 
a consequence of the recording of these documents, the respon-
dents answered appellant's suit for specific performance and in 
addition, counter-claimed alleging that such a recording con-
stituted a slander against their title. Appellant made a motion 
to dismiss respondent's counterclaim of slander of title, which 
motion the Court granted, prior to submitting the matter to the 
jury. Respondents are now petitioning this Court to reinstate 
their countersuit. 
Slander of title is defined as a false and malicious state-
ment, oral or written, made in disparagement of a person's title 
to real or personal property, causing him injury. The term is 
employed to describe words or conduct which bring or intend to 
bring in question another's right to title to particular pro-
perty. See 5 0 Am.Jur.2d, 105 8. An annotation titled "Recording 
of Instrument Purporting to Effect Title as Slander of Title", §1 
in 39 ALR2d 840, 842, states: 
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There is no doubt that the act of wrong-
fully filing of record an unfounded claim to 
the property of another is actionable as slan-
der of title, given the other elements of that 
action, just as any other spoken or written 
assertion reflecting on the plaintiff's owner-
ship would be. And this is true although the 
instrument recorded may be such that one learned 
in the law would realize that the claim asserted 
therein is unfounded, so long as it is one which 
the ordinary purchaser would regard as clouding 
plaintiff's title* 
The case of Olsen v. Kidman, 120 Utah 443, 235 P.2d 510 
(1951), involved a real estate broker who improperly recorded a 
claim of lien upon the property of the plaintiff. The Utah 
Supreme Court, regarding the elements of a cause of action for 
slander of title, said: 
The defendant and appellant, Leslie Kidman, 
contends that the Utah cases and the law gener-
ally regarding slander of title require that be-
fore liability can be found, the recorder of the 
slanderous document must have known that he assert-
ed a false claim without any foundation or right. 
In Dowse v. Doris Trust Co., Utah , 208 P.2d 956, 
and in Sproul v. Parks, Utah, 210 P.2d 436, the 
facts recited indicate that the wrongful actions 
were actuated by malice in fact. In the Dowse 
case we said that the malicious filing for record 
of an instrument known to be inoperative is re-
garded as slander of title. 
[4] This does not mean that where the in-
strument is filed without a privilege or right 
to do so that actual malice must be proved in 
order to establish liability. The rule has 
been clearly stated in Gudger v. Manton, 21 
Cal.2d 537, 134 P.2d 217, and in Phillips v. 
Glazer, 94 Cal.App.2d 673, 211 P.2d 37,40. 
In the latter case, the court said: "Slander 
of title is effected by one who without pri-
vilege publishes untrue and disparaging 
statements with respect to the property of 
another under such circumstances as would lead 
a reasonable person to foresee that a prospec-
tive purchaser or lessee thereof might abandon 
his intentions. Rest., Torts, sec. 624. It 
is an invasion of the interest in the vendi-
bility of property. In order to commit the 
tort, actual malice or ill will is unnecessary. 
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Gudger v. Manton [supra] Rest., Torts, sees. 
624, 625, 628. To be disparaging, a state-
ment need not be a complete denial of title 
in others, but may be any unfounded claim of 
an interest in the property which throws 
doubt upon its ownership. Gudger v. Manton, 
supra." 
To this may be added the comment on clause 
B of Restatement on Torts, sec. 625: It is 
not necessary that the publisher of a dispara-
ging statement know or believe it to be false 
nor is it necessary that as a reasonable man 
he should know or believe that it is untrue. 
Furthermore it is immaterial that he has reason-
able grounds for his belief in its truth. As 
in an action for defamation, if the other es-
sentials to liability are present, the publish-
er of disparaging matter takes the risk that it 
is untrue. 
For additional support, see Dowse v. Doris Trust Company, 
116 Utah 106, 208 P.2d 956 (1949), which was another action for 
slander of title in v/hich it was alleged by the owner of certain 
real property that an instrument was recorded falsely and mali-
ciously with an intent to encumber and cloud the owner's title. 
The Utah Supreme Court said: 
[2] In the Restatement of the Law on 
Torts, Vol. Ill, Sec. 624, page 325, the 
general rule as to what acts will make one 
liable for slander of title is stated as 
follows: 
"One who, without privilege to do so, 
publishes matter which is untrue and dis-
paraging to another's property in land, chat-
tels or intangible things under such circum-
stances as would lead a reasonable man to 
forsee that the conduct of a third person 
as purchaser or lessee thereof might be de-
termined thereby is liable for pecuniary 
loss resulting to the other from the impair-
ment of vendibility thus caused." 
In Pender v. Dowse, 1 Utah2d 283, 365 P.2d 644 (1954), another 
slander of title action, the Utah Supreme Court said that for one 
to be liable for slander of title, he must publish matter which 
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is untrue and disparaging to another's property. 
Malice is an element of the cause of action for slander of 
title. It is immaterial that one who records has reasonable 
grounds for his belief that the instrument is true. See Olsen, %k 
supra. In Howarth v. Ostergaard, 30 Utah 2d 183, 515 P.2d 442 m 
m 
(1973), the Utah Supreme Court stated that malice may be implied. 
m 
[1,2] It is generally held that malice is
 g 
an element of the cause of action for slander 
of title. However, we concede the correctness « 
of plaintiffs1 argument that this does not re-
quire that it be affirmatively shown that the * 
wrong was done with an intent to injure, vex or 
annoy, or because of hatred, spite or ill will. ' 
The malice may be implied by the law, where a i 
party knowingly and wrongfully records or pub-
lishes something which is spurious or untrue, * 
or which gives a false or misleading impression,
 h 
adverse to another's title, under such circum-
stances that he should reasonably forsee might
 v 
result in damage to the property owner. 
Appellant knew at the time of the recording of the contract 
that the contract was void and misleading, that they had already « 
forfeited all rights in the property due to delinquency of pay- l 
I 
ments and abandoment. 
i 
The malice requirement is easily met by the fact that the 
recorded instrument is void. The Utah court in Howarth v. 
Ostergaard, supra, clearly held that the necessary malice is i 
no more than merely recording a misleading document which is | 
I 
adverse to another's title and which the one recording should 
reasonably forsee might result in damage to the property owner. 
The respondents in the present case have suffered general 
damages due to appellant's action in that they have had to j 
retain counsel. They have suffered damage in that they cannot 
sell the title to the land in its present condition. They have 
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suffered damage in that they cannot use the land as security with 
the present cloud on the title. 
Punitive damages should also be awarded in the instant case 
due to the annoying nature of the suit. 
The respondents should also recover their costs in defending 
this suit and putting forth their counterclaim as well as receive 
compensation for a reasonable attorney's fee. 
It is well established in Utah that recovery of general 
damages, punitive damages, attorneys fees and other costs are 
recoverable in slander of title actions. 
The action of slander of title is based on 
a wrongful act but for which the plaintiff 
would not have had to incur any expense, either 
for costs or for attorney's fees. 
Attorney's fees are certainly a reason-
able expense of litigation. 
. . . (P)unitive damages may be awarded 
in an action for slander of title . . . Dowse 
v. Doris Trust Co., supra. 
The respondents1 counterclaim was sufficient to state a 
claim for slander of title within the law set forth above. 
Respondents submit that it was improper for the lower court to 
dismiss their counterclaim as a matter of law when sufficient 
facts exist to constitute slander of title. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant has failed to maintain its burden on appeal of 
showing that the judgment of the trial court was against the 
clear weight of the evidence. A reading of the transcript and 
an.examination of the exhibits will demonstrate to this court 
that there was sufficient evidence presented from which the ad-
visory jury and the judge could find that the contract had been 
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abandoned* For this reason, the judgment of the lower court of 
abandonment of the contract by the appellant should be affirmed* 
Additionally, the respondents have alleged facts in their 
counterclaim for slander of title, which if proven, would consti-
tute a slander of title as defined in the case law of this state. 
For this reason, the counterclaim of slander of title should be 
reinstated and remanded to the lower court for trial. 
O^CKSON HOWA 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 








I,Fred Howard, hereby certify that I delivered two copies of 
the foregoing Brief to Gary A. Sargent, Attorney for Plaintiff-
Appellant, 500 American Savings Building, 61 South Main Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 27th day of June, 1975. 
